Monday 11 December 2017

Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed - Brexit reflections #17.

June 2016 and the Referendum now seem a very long time ago.  We were neophytes then, and in the slow and painful subsequent months both Remainers and Leavers have discovered more about themselves, their friends and cross-border trading arrangements.

I have re-read some of my previous sixteen Brexit reflections, and I'm pleased to record that I don't ever seem to have been a gung-ho Brexiteer.  Before the election I wrote "To be clear, there would be drawbacks and risks to leaving.  This isn't a choice between something self-evidently good and something self-evidently bad.  It's a choice between two almost equally unsatisfactory and dangerous things".  It's also heartening to record that even then I was quite clear that the doom-laden economic forecasts were rubbish, and that the pound was likely to fall, with knock-on effects for Britain's manufacturing and for inflation levels.

What is notably absent from my posts is any sense of the complexities of the situation regarding the Irish border.  I'm not suggesting these weren't aired at all in the media; they probably were (and particularly in the Republic of Ireland).  But they didn't figure largely in the UK campaign, or in the case the Cameron government put for Remaining.

Boy, has that all changed.

First, a quick point about the form of words (I'm not going to call it an agreement, for reasons which will become clear) reached last week which has enabled Brexit talks to move on to trade.  The Irish position - that there could be no trade talks without a guarantee of a soft border - was always unsustainable, both intellectually and politically. Intellectually because we won't know what kind of border there will have to be until we know what the trade deal will look like.  Politically because Mrs May depends on the DUP to remain in office, and the DUP will never agree to a border down the Irish Sea. 

The Republic got itself in this position, I suspect, largely because of the enthusiasm and inexperience of its Premier Mr Varadkar.  The EU has rescued him from his own naivety.

This morning the British press is full of warnings that the deal could unravel because of remarks allegedly made by David Davis (and other Tory politicians) to the effect that the UK hasn't agreed to anything binding.  But Davis, although perhaps tactless, is correct.  For one thing, the text of the agreement makes it clear that the arrangement is subject to contrary agreement between the parties.  But for another, and crucially, the document says at the very outset that it should be read "Under the caveat that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed . . . "  Including, presumably, the document itself.

None of that means that the border issue is one which will just go away.  It is a circle which will have to be squared.  But it does mean that Mrs May has got her way on the sequencing, and that the EU26 have grasped the fatuity of the Irish position.

Where does all that leave us?  The great risk is that the Remainers in the Government will push us towards a deal which leaves the UK paying EU contributions whilst having no say in EU regulations and being restricted to signing trade deals with only those third party countries whose regulations themselves comply with those of the EU.  Undoubtedly this is what the EU would like. 

My second fear is that, as the March 19 deadline approaches, the EU will lure us into complacency.  A deal will seem to be quite near.  Preparations for No Deal - hard borders, new customs provision - would be minimal.  But then, when it was too late for these preparations to be made, a deal would suddenly seem quite far away, unless agreed on terms demanded by the EU.

This second fear plays into the first in the sense that the HMG Remainers (including of course the civil service) are most likely to believe that a watered down version of present arrangements is the best we can manage, and thus the least likely to be arguing that, since No Deal has its attractions, it is essential that we prepare for it, if only to be able to point out to the EU that it is a viable alternative. 

If you doubt the Stockholm syndrome exhibited by HMG Remainers, I would point to the statement by Philip Hammond over the weekend that even if the UK ended up with No Deal we could still end up paying a divorce bill to the EU.  No one on either side of the argument has ever suggested that there is any legal basis for paying a divorce bill. The treaties contain no such provision. Mrs May's £40bn offer is a conditional sweetener for trade talks ("nothing is agreed until everything is agreed"). It can be just as easily withdrawn in the event of No Deal. Philip Hammond is so determined to do a deal, however compromised, that he is willing to surrender the UK's principal bargaining chip - the money. His conduct is extraordinary.

It's becoming clear that, whatever else, the EU is a tremendously powerful and slippery creature (like one of Blue Planet's octopuses), its tentacles reaching into every aspect of British life. Those who say our membership has entailed surrendering little sovereignty might like to reflect on our difficulties in extricating ourselves. They might also like to consider statements made by Messrs Juncker and Schulz in recent weeks concerning the EU's federalist ambitions.

All of these things make me more convinced that voting Leave was the right thing to do. The conduct of the pro-Remain establishment has been smug, condescending and manipulative, although this is a subject for another day. I have absolutely no doubt that Britain can do very well outside the EU, and my worry is that we are presently governed by people who did not believe this before the Referendum and who don't believe it now. There is surely going to come a crunch point for the Tories, where they have to decide what kind of Brexit they want. That will be Mrs May's point of greatest internal danger.

As for the Irish, it's ironic that, having struggled for centuries to throw off the British yoke, they seem petrified of a greater distance between Ireland and Britain.  And that having founded their national story on the fight for autonomy they seem so determined to prevent their countrymen in the North from having it themselves.